Links 24.2024
On a Personal Note
I’m back from Gummersbach. Hussam and I were running a super intense workshop on everything digital (artificial intelligence, big tech, social media, Bitcoin, and much more). And while I am super happy with the results, I feel like I need to unplug for a while. Yet, nobody ain’t time for that. The best I can do is to unplug myself from the food intake that usually gets out of hand at the Theodor-Heuss-Akademie. So, I am fasting for the next couple of days. This is unfortunate for everybody around me but we all know: What needs to be done, needs to be done.
Moreover, I just finished recording another podcast episode. This time, Philipp and I are covering the European elections. And (as usual) I will have some hot takes ready, one of which will be on the ideological direction of the EU. I side (once again) with Steve Davies: With the European right maturing and gradually influencing the European project more and more, the Euroskeptics of the future will be left-wing. I will link to the episode once it is published!
America Is Losing the Arab World
This piece is crucial. The Russian invasion of Ukraine threw the West into a new "Geopolitical Moment"™, shattering the fragile consensus of the post-Cold War world order. Again, this probably shouldn’t have surprised anyone following international politics, yet Western leaders were undeniably caught off guard.
The ongoing conflict in Gaza has intensified this dynamic. As the United States grapples with domestic issues like the Global Financial Crisis and the Trump era, its role as the global power broker is (once again) under scrutiny. And perhaps rightfully so. Now, these numbers coming out from the Middle East should lead the West to seriously reflect on its future direction. Luckily, there still seems to be room for maneuver and course correction: The rising support for China in the region seems to be rather fueled by anti-Western sentiment than anything else.
In any case, read the whole thing:
October 7, 2023, was a watershed moment not just for Israel but for the Arab world. Hamas’s horrific attack occurred just as a new order appeared to be emerging in the region. Three years earlier, four members of the Arab League—Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—had launched processes to normalize their diplomatic relations with Israel. As the summer of 2023 drew to a close, the most important Arab country that still did not recognize Israel, Saudi Arabia, looked poised to do so, too.
Hamas’s assault and Israel’s subsequent devastating military operation in Gaza have curtailed this march toward normalization. Saudi Arabia has stated that it will not proceed with a normalization deal until Israel takes clear steps to facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian state. Jordan recalled its ambassador to Israel in November 2023, and a visit to Morocco by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu planned for late 2023 never materialized. Arab leaders have watched warily as their citizens have grown vocally opposed to the war in Gaza. In many Arab countries, thousands have turned out to protest Israel’s war and the humanitarian crisis it has produced. Protesters in Jordan and Morocco have also called for an end to their countries’ respective peace treaties with Israel, voicing frustration that their governments are not listening to the people.
October 7 may turn out to be a watershed moment for the United States, too. Because of the war in Gaza, Arab public opinion has turned sharply against Israel’s staunchest ally, the United States—a development that could confound U.S. efforts not only to help resolve the crisis in Gaza but also to contain Iran and push back against China’s growing influence in the Middle East. Since 2006, Arab Barometer, the nonpartisan research organization we run, has conducted biannual nationally representative opinion surveys in 16 Arab countries, capturing ordinary citizens’ views in a region that has little opinion polling. After the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, other polls consistently found that few ordinary Arab citizens held positive views of the United States. By 2022, however, their attitudes had improved somewhat, with at least a third of respondents in nearly all countries Arab Barometer surveyed affirming that they held “a very favorable” or “somewhat favorable” opinion of the United States.
But surveys we conducted in five countries in late 2023 and early 2024 show that the United States’ standing among Arab citizens has declined dramatically. A poll in Tunisia conducted partially before and partially after October 7 strongly suggested that this shift occurred in response to the events in Gaza. Perhaps even more surprising, the surveys also made it clear that the United States’ loss has been China’s gain. Arab citizens’ views of China have warmed in our recent surveys, reversing a half-decade trend of weakening support for China in the Arab world. When asked if China has undertaken serious efforts to protect Palestinian rights, however, few respondents agreed. This result suggests that Arab views reflect a profound dissatisfaction with the United States rather than specific support for Chinese policies toward Gaza.
[…]
U.S. analysts and politicians often imply that what they sometimes dismissively call “the Arab street” should be of little concern to American foreign policy. Because most Arab leaders are authoritarian, the argument goes, they do not care much about public opinion, and U.S. policymakers should therefore prioritize making deals with powerbrokers over winning the hearts and minds of Arab citizens. In general, however, the notion that Arab leaders are not constrained by public opinion is a myth. The Arab Spring uprisings toppled governments in four countries, and widespread protests in 2019 led to changes in leadership in four other Arab countries. Authoritarians, too, must consider the views of the people they govern. Few Arab leaders now want to be seen openly cooperating with Washington, given the sharp rise in anti-American sentiment among the populations they rule. Arab citizens’ anger at U.S. foreign policy could also have serious direct consequences for the United States.
[…]
Despite the horror of Hamas’s attack, few Arab Barometer respondents agreed that it ought to be called a “terrorist act.” By contrast, the vast majority agreed that Israel’s campaign in Gaza ought to be classified as terrorism. For the most part, Arab citizens surveyed after October 7 assessed the situation in Gaza as dire. When asked which of seven words, including “war,” “hostilities,” “massacre,” and “genocide,” best described the ongoing events in Gaza, the most common term respondents chose in all but one country was “genocide.” Only in Morocco did a substantial number of respondents—24 percent—call those events a “war,” about the same percentage of Moroccans that called it a “massacre.” Everywhere else, less than 15 percent of respondents chose “war” to characterize what was happening in Gaza.
[…]
These perceptions in the Arab world about Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and about the United States’ approach to it, appear to have had major consequences for the United States’ overall reputation. […] In Jordan, the percentage of respondents that viewed the United States favorably dropped dramatically, from 51 percent in 2022 to 28 percent in a poll conducted in the winter of 2023–24. [..] [I]n Lebanon, it fell from 42 percent in the winter of 2021–22 to 27 percent in early 2024. [..] The timing of our survey in Tunisia strongly suggests that Israel’s military campaign in Gaza drove this overall decline. In the three weeks before October 7, 40 percent of Tunisians said they had a favorable view of the United States. By October 27, not quite three weeks after the start of Israel’s military operations in Gaza, just ten percent of Tunisians said the same.
[…]
Despite offering limited material and rhetorical support for Gaza, China has been the primary beneficiary of the United States’ decline in reputation among Arab publics. [...] In all the countries Arab Barometer surveyed after October 7, at least half the respondents said they held favorable views of China. In both Jordan and Morocco, key U.S. allies, China has benefited from at least a 15-point increase in its favorability ratings. When asked whether U.S. or Chinese policies are better for their region’s security, respondents in three of the five countries we surveyed after October 7 said they preferred China’s approach.
[…]
[I]n Arab Barometer surveys in Jordan and Lebanon after October 7, substantially more respondents agreed that China’s policies are better than the United States’ at protecting rights and freedoms.
China’s record on protecting rights and freedoms at home and abroad is poor, but the Lebanese and Jordanian populations now consider the United States’ record to be even worse.
We Haven’t Hit Peak Populism Yet
This article won’t be something new to the long-standing readers of this newsletter. Because you heard it here first: Populism is the global phenomenon of our time. Again, this claim seems rather trivial today; but (as it is the case for any good prediction) it wasn’t when I launched this newsletter to keep track of the rise of illiberalism.
Yet, this isn’t meant to be a self-indulgent victory dance. Rather, it shall serve as a reminder that we are still amidst this political realignment. Some of the statistics that David Brooks mentions here are extremely concerning for liberals—because they don’t seem to have learned from a full decade of “The Populist Backlash.” More to come…unfortunately:
We used to have long debates about American exceptionalism, about whether this country was an outlier among nations, and I always thought the bulk of the evidence suggested that it was. But these days our political attitudes are pretty ordinary. America, far from standing out as the champion of democracy, as a nation that welcomes immigrants, as a perpetually youthful nation energized by its faith in the American dream, is now caught in the same sour, populist mood as pretty much everywhere else.
Earlier this year, for example, the Ipsos research firm issued a report based on interviews with 20,630 adults in 28 countries, including South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil and Germany, last November and December. On question after question the American responses were, well, average.
Our pessimism is average. Roughly 59 percent of Americans said they believed their country is in decline, compared to 58 percent of people across all 28 countries who said that. Sixty percent of Americans agreed with the statement “the system is broken,” compared to 61 percent in the worldwide sample who agreed with that.
Our hostility to elites is average. Sixty-nine percent of Americans agreed that the “political and economic elite don’t care about hard-working people,” compared with 67 percent of respondents among all 28 nations. Sixty-three percent of Americans agreed that “experts in this country don’t understand the lives of people like me,” compared with 62 percent of respondents worldwide.
Americans’ authoritarian tendencies are pretty average. Sixty-six percent of Americans said that the country “needs a strong leader to take the country back from the rich and powerful,” compared with 63 percent of respondents among the 28 nations overall. Forty percent of Americans said they believed we need a strong leader who will “break the rules,” which was only a bit below the 49 percent globally who believed that.
Those results reveal a political climate — in the United States and across the world — that is extremely favorable for right-wing populists. That matters because this is a year of decision, a year in which at least 64 countries will hold national elections. Populism has emerged as the dominant global movement.
[…]
If anything, the evidence suggests that the momentum is still on the populist side. Trump seems to be expanding his lead among working-class voters. In Europe, populists are making big gains, not just among the old and disillusioned, but among the young. According to one survey, 41 percent of European voters aged 18 to 35 have moved toward the right or far right. In the recent Portuguese elections, young voters surged to the right- wing populist Chega (Enough) party while nearly half the support for the rival Socialist Party came from voters older than 65.
[…]
The trends also suggest that we could be in one of those magnetic years in world history. There are certain moments in history, like 1848 and 1989, when events in different countries seem to build on one another, when you get sweeping cascades that bring similar changes to different nations, when the global consciousness seems to shift.
Of course, the main difference between those years and 2024 is that during those earlier pivotal moments the world experienced an expansion of freedom, the spread of democracy, the advance of liberal values. This year we’re likely to see all those widely in retreat.
Is there a way to fight back against the populist tide? Of course there is, but it begins with the humble recognition that the attitudes that undergird populism emerged over decades and now span the globe. If social trust is to be rebuilt, it probably has to be rebuilt on the ground, from the bottom up. As for what mainstream candidates should do this election year, I can’t improve on the advice offered by the Hoover Institution scholar Larry Diamond in The American Interest magazine in 2020:
Don’t try to out-polarize the polarizer. If you stridently denounce the populist, you only mobilize his base and make yourself look like part of the hated establishment.
Reach out to the doubting elements of his supporters. Don’t question the character of his backers or condescend; appeal to their interests and positive dreams.
Avoid tit-for-tat name calling. You’ll be playing his game, and you’ll look smaller.
Craft an issue-packed campaign. The Ipsos survey shows that even people who hate the system are eager for programs that create jobs, improve education, health care and public safety. As Diamond puts it, “Offer substantive, practical, nonideological policy proposals.”
Don’t let the populists own patriotism. Offer a liberal version of national pride that gives people a sense of belonging across difference.
Don’t be boring. The battle for attention is remorseless. Don’t let advisers make their candidates predictable, hidden and safe.
It’s looking like this year’s elections will be won by whichever side stands for change. Populists promise to tear down systems. Liberals need to make the case for changing them in a comprehensive and constructive way.
How are they doing? The academic performance and mental wellbeing of world cup babies
Science Corner, EURO Edition. Make out of the results whatever you want but as a German, I wouldn’t mind a deep run of the German team (remember my predictions) considering our demographics :P
Abstract
In June 2002, South Korea cohosted the 17th FIFA World Cup. Unexpected wins carried the Korean National Football Team to the semi-finals and sparked an unprecedented euphoria among Koreans. Die-hard fans and occasional football viewers, young and old, women and men flocked the streets side by side, cheered for their team, and partied through the nights. In the subsequent spring of 2003, the country experienced a temporary and significant increase in its fertility rate. Using a difference-in-differences design, we exploit the quasi-experimental nature of this episode to investigate the Beckerian trade-off between the quantity and quality of children born to parents in South Korea. Our results support the notion of an adverse effect on child quality. Students born approximately ten months after the World Cup tend to perform significantly worse in school. Moreover, our results uncover a hitherto overlooked aspect: the same students exhibit significantly higher degrees of mental wellbeing.
Editors at Philosophy & Public Affairs Resign; Will Launch New OA Journal
This one is more for the philosophy crowd—but for those, it is a bombshell: The most influential journal in the field of political philosophy has just imploded. At this point, I am not sure whether this is a final wake-up call for the academic publishing industry or yet another naive attempt to fix a broken system. As I have said many times before, the problem with academic truth-finding is probably rooted deeper in its current incentive system than in the mere commercial usage of papers. Time will tell. Yet, one thing is for sure, this is crème de la crème of political philosophy revolting. Just look at the names of the outgoing editorial board.
The executive, associate, and advisory editors and all of the editorial board members of one of the most influential journals in moral and political philosophy, Philosophy & Public Affairs, have resigned en masse.
According to their statement, crucial aims of scholarly journals are “not well-served by commercial publishing.” Philosophy & Public Affairs is published by Wiley, the sixth largest publishing corporation in the world by revenue (over $2 billion annually).
The outgoing editors and editorial board members will be launching a new diamond open-access journal to be published by Open Library of Humanities (OLH), and will be occupying at the new journal the same positions they held at Philosophy & Public Affairs. (Current editor-in-chief of Philosophy & Public Affairs, Anna Stilz, is not among the statement’s signatories. In answer to an inquiry about that, she replied, “I cannot comment on this at this time.” That said, it is worth noting that Stilz has been publicly critical of Wiley in the past)
Readers may recall the similar resignation last year of the editorial team at the Journal of Political Philosophy, another Wiley journal, and that team’s creation of Political Philosophy, also a diamond open-access journal published by OLH. At least 11 Wiley journals have seen mass editorial resignations since 2018, according to Retraction Watch.
The as-of-yet-unnamed new journal will be open for submissions beginning in September.
In the statement below, the editors and editorial board members announce their resignation, explain their reasons for it and for their creation of an open-access journal, and discuss issues related to submissions currently under review at Philosophy & Public Affairs.
[…]
Outgoing Executive Editors
Jonathan Quong, University of Southern California, USA
Patrick Tomlin, University of Warwick, UK
Outgoing Associate Editors
Arash Abizadeh, McGill University, Canada
Nico Cornell, University of Michigan, USA
Garrett Cullity, Australian National University
Marc Fleurbaey, Paris School of Economics, France
Johann Frick, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Joe Horton, University College London, UK
Sophia Moreau, University of Toronto, Canada
Kristi Olson, Bowdoin College, USA
Japa Pallikkathayil, University of Pittsburgh, USA
Gina Schouten, Harvard University, USA
Zofia Stemplowska, University of Oxford, UK
Adam Swift, University College London, UK
Outgoing Advisory Editors
Charles R. Beitz, Princeton University, USA
Joshua Cohen, Apple University, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Alan Patten, Princeton University, USA
Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto, Canada
Seana Shiffrin, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
R. Jay Wallace, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Outgoing Editorial Board
Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan, USA
Cheshire Calhoun, Arizona State University, USA
David Estlund, Brown University, USA
Archon Fung, Harvard Kennedy School, USA
Barbara Herman, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Pamela Hieronymi, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
Frances Myrna Kamm, Rutgers University, USA
Niko Kolodny, University of California, Berkeley, USA
Jeff McMahan, Oxford University, UK
Liam Murphy, New York University, USA
Debra Satz, Stanford University, USA
Samuel Scheffler, New York University, USA
Amartya Sen, Harvard University, USA
Tommie Shelby, Harvard University, USA
Amia Srinivasan, Oxford University, UK
Jeremy Waldron, New York University, USA
Stuart White, Oxford University, UK
Gideon Yaffe, Yale University, USA
You Are What You Read, Even If You Don’t Always Remember It
Let’s close with some inspiration. Many of you might be upset for not remembering everything you have read. Yet, in the era of the extended mind, this is a useless skill anyway. Instead, make this your mantra: I cannot remember what I read in this newsletter, yet it made me. Well, at least partially, I hope!
Here’s Dave Rupert:
the goal of a book isn’t to get to the last page, it’s to expand your thinking.
I have to constantly remind myself of this. Especially in an environment that prioritizes optimizing and maximizing personal productivity, where it seems if you can’t measure (let alone remember) the impact of a book in your life then it wasn’t worth reading.
I don’t believe that, but I never quite had the words for expressing why I don’t believe that. Dave’s articulation hit pretty close.
Then a couple days later my wife sent me this quote from Ralph Waldo Emerson:
I cannot remember the books I've read any more than the meals I have eaten; even so, they have made me.
YES!
Damn, great writers are sO gOOd wITh wORdz, amirite?
Emerson articulates with acute brevity something I couldn’t suss out in my own thoughts, let alone put into words. It makes me jealous.
Anyhow, I wanted to write this down to reinforce remembering it.
And in a similar vein for the online world: I cannot remember the blog posts I’ve read any more than the meals I’ve eaten; even so, they’ve made me.
It’s a good reminder to be mindful of my content diet — you are what you eat read, even if you don’t always remember it.
[…]
@halas@mastodon.social shared this story in response, which I really liked:
At the university I had a professor who had a class with us in the first year and then in the second. At the beginning of the second year’s classes he asked us something from the material of previous year. When met with silence he nodded thoughtfully and said: “Education is something you have even if you don't remember anything”
I love stories that stick with people like that, e.g. “something a teacher told me once...”
Peace,
SG